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action was taken upon them. This holding can be founded on the 
statement in The Practice of the Court of King’s Bench and Common 
Picas, in Personal Actions and Ejectment, 8th cd. bv W illiam  Tidd, 
that:
. . . .  [W jh e rc  the a ffid av it i>: a m ere n u llity , as being m ade by a 
person convicted o f fe lon y, o r does not contain any positive  oath , o r  
cause o f action, the court w ill not receive a supft'emental a ffid av it . . .•**
A number of other objections were made to both the order to 
hold to bail and the writ. However thev did not enter into the judg­
ment.
1 he judgment points up that failure to adhere strictly to the re­
quirements or practice may—and indeed in this case, does—defeat the 
immediate object of the proceedings. The function of the writ of 
capias is to take security from a defendant about to quit the Province. 
Such a defendant is placed in a disadvantageous position as compared 
to the ordinary defendant with his ability to delay and frustrate the 
plaintiff contingent upon the giving of security. A plaintiff who bv 
want of form has a capias proceeding set aside stands to be put to great 
inconvenience and may well lose the amount in issue.
—J. W . McManus, II Law, U.N.B.
5. Pp. 191-2. See also W hitehead v. B ennett 118461 6 L.T.O.S. 313, where the defect 
in the original affidavit cou’.d not be remedied by a supplemental affidavit.
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SAVAGE v. W ILBY AND W ILBY AND DELONG1
Landloid and Tenant — Master and Servant — Negligence — Vicarious 
L iability of Tenant for Negligence of Independent Contractor — 
Common Means Employed by Contractor — Tenant W ithout Knowl­
edge of Risk Involved.
In this case the Supreme Court of Canada was again confronted 
with the exceptions to the general, and well established, rule of law 
that a principal is never liable for the negligence of an independent 
contractor. These exceptions, briefly summarized, fall into two broad 
classes: first, where the principal is under an absolute or strict liability; 
and second, where the undertaking instigated by the principal is, in 
itself, inherentiv dangerous; and in these instances a stringent duty to 
take care, or to see that due and proper care is taken, is placed upon 
the principal, and if, under these conditions, injury should occur to 
another through the negligence of an independent contractor, tfien the 
principal becomes vicariously liable.
W ith  regard to this non-delegatable liability Sahnond has stated-
that:
1. [1953] 4 D.L.R. 32&.
2. Salm ond on Torts t i l t h  ed.i p. 133.
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the tendency o f legal developm en t is in the d irection  o f extend ing  
ra th e r than restricting  this liab ility
and Friedmann has advanced this idea further with his proposition* 
that:
the trad itio n a l distinction  between an em ployer's lia b ility  fo r  
the acts o f his servants and fo r those o f his in dependent con 
trac to r, has no longer any real m eaning.
From the reasons given for the decision in the case under discussion 
it may well be concluded that the Supreme Court of Canada is adhering 
to this modern legal trend.
The appellant Savage was lessee of a ground floor in the C ity of 
Frcdericton owned by the respondent W ilby. The premises were to be 
used as a restaurant, and in the course of redecorating the appellant 
hired the respondent DeLong, a painter contractor. DeLong, in under­
taking the removal of paint, at first used a remover of brand name 
CCO-IO which was noninflammable, but, when the odour from this 
remover was found to be nauseating to his employees, he later changed 
to a highly inflammable liquid remover known as Taxite. During the 
use of the Taxite a fire occurred causing serious damage to the premises, 
and resulting in an action by W ilby against both DeLong ana Savage. 
At the original hearing in the New Brunswick Supreme Court, Queens 
Bench Division, Bridges J. found the contractor guilty of negligence, 
and, the actual cause of the fire being undetermined, applied the doc­
trine of res ipsa loquitur; but he excluded the appellant Savage from 
liability on the ground that it was beyond his knowledge to realize the 
danger involved. On appeal, before the New Brunswick Court of Ap­
peal, the liability of the respondent DeLong for negligence was affirm­
ed, and the appellant Savage was also hela liable on the finding that 
there was a dangerous undertaking which a reasonable man mignt ex-
Pect to cause damage to others if due and proper care was not taken, lughes J., in his dissenting judgment as to tne liability of Savage, held 
that the dangerous nature or Taxite paint remover was not of common 
knowledge and therefore should not have been ordinarily known to a 
reasonable man, and also that the substitution of the highly inflammable 
Taxite liquid, for the noninflammable CCO-IO, was done without the 
knowledge of the appellant Savage. On appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Canaaa it was held, affirming the Appeal Court of New Brunswick, 
that the appellant’s actual knowledge or the probable danger was im ­
material, as the dangerous nature of Taxite was such as snould have 
been known by him as a reasonable man, and that he was therefore 
under a duty to see that due precautions were taken, and that the damage 
resulted from the lack of such precautions.
In coming to this decision it was necessary for the Supreme Court 
to recognize and to answer three questions: viz.— W hat is a dangerous 
or hazardous undertaking? W hat are the boundaries confining what a
3. 1 Modern Law Review, p. 54.
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reasonable man must be expected to foresee? W hat is required to dis­
charge the taking of "due and reasonable precautions”?
In relation to the first question the Court made reference to the 
cases of Grote v. Chester Holyhead Railway4, and St. John v. Donald', 
and, on the basis of the two cases held, in the words of Rand J.M:
. . . d ifficu lties m ay arise in d e term in in g  when the circum stances 
present the degree o f danger a ttrac tin g  the ru le . Imt . . . here . . . 
the excess o f risk was present.
In the Grote case the undertaking was the building of a railway bridge, 
which must be properly done or be a hazard to the public as passengers; 
in the St. John case the undertaking was the handling of explosives; in 
both, the dangerous and hazardous aspects of the undertaking were 
clearly within tne conception of what was intended to be an undertak­
ing inherently dangerous in itself. In his decision in the St. John 
case, Anglin J., in discussing hazardous undertakings, said in part7:
. . .  o f a n atu re  likely  to in vo lve  in ju rio u s consequences to 
others . . .
Is paint remover capable of being so classed? In its highly inflammable 
nature there is the possibility of accident and injury, but its common 
and every day use would seem to remove any expected possibilitv into 
the realm of remote probability. Indeed, a number of painting con­
tractors called as witnesses testified to the fact that they had used 
Taxite, or removers akin to it, on many hundreds of occasions without 
mishap, and further, that the probability of such, or any, mishap had 
never primarily occupied their concern. Considering that, in the case 
of FosDroke-líobbes v. Airwork Lim ited, in 1936*, tne courts were re­
luctant to place air travel within the scope of a hazardous undertaking, 
it can only be concluded that by placing paint remover within this 
scope the Supreme Court has taken a step in the direction of widening 
the limits intended a dangerous undertaking, to include, not only such 
as are inherently dangerous in themselves, but those to which even the 
improbable aspect of injurious consequences attach.
Turning to the second question the Court’s answer is found in 
the words or Cartwright J.":
In m y op in ion  a reasonable m an in the position o f the ap p ellan t 
ought to have forseen the danger w hich the w ork w ould  create.
Here the Court relied 0 1 1  the decision in Dalton v. Angus10, which 
concerned the lateral support of an adjoining building. On the same 
point the New Brunswick Court of Appeal considered the decisión in 
the case of Brooke v. Bool11, where a joint tortfeasor had searched for 
a gas leak with the aid of a match. In both cases the possible danger
4. (18481 2 Ex. 251; 154 E.R. 485.
5. 119261 2 D.L.R. 185.
6. 11954 1 3 D.L.R. 206.
7. 119261 2 D.L.R. 191.
8. [1936 1 53 T.L.R. 254.
9. [1954 ] 3 D.L.R. 210.
10. [18811 6 A C. 740.
11. [1928] 2 K.B. 578.
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from the act clone was clcarlv of the type which a reasonable man might 
be expected to recognize. W ere the circumstances in the instant case 
similar?
Undoubtedly, the appellant Savage should have known of the 
highly inflammable nature of the substance in use, in view of the fact 
that nearly all such removing or cleaning products are of that nature. 
Hughes J., however, in his dissenting judgment in the New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal, was of the opinion tnat, in the absence of knowledge 
that the highly inflammable I axite had been substituted in the course 
of the undertaking for a noninflammable remover, no danger existed 
which should have been foreseen by the appellant. But, it is submitted, 
the true question for determination was whether the appellant, as a 
reasonable man, could have been expected to foresee that the acts of 
the contractor would be performed in such a manner as to invoke the 
known possibility of danger. Should he, having hired an experienced 
contractor, been expected to foresee that the contractor would act in a 
manner encouraging mishap? Even with the knowledge of the possibil­
ity of danger, would it not be unreasonable to hold him foreseeable of 
such acts, in a legal sense, unless he also possessed the competency to 
understand the intricacies of the work itself, and to recognize that it was 
being performed in an undesirable and danger provoking manner? In the 
result this decision would appear to have widened the dutv of the 
principal to inquire and, Correspondingly, to have extended the range 
of foreseeability in law.
To the third question, whether Savage had exercised due and 
reasonable care in tne presence of the foreseeable danger, the Court 
answered in the negative, as there was nothing in the record to suggest 
that he gave any directions to the contractor, or took any steps what­
soever, in regard to the performance ot the undertaking. But the 
question remains basic: W hat precautions would have relieved Savage 
of liability? The idea that there really is any such relief has often been 
questioned, but it would appear from the statement of Cockburn J. 
tnat:12
W h en  w ork is like ly  to cause dam age to an o th er . . . [T h ere  is] a 
du ty  to take a ll reasonable precautions against such danger.
that such relief is in fact possible; to the same effect are the observa­
tions of W infield :13
T h e  defendent is answ erable not o n ly  fo r his own w rongdoing . . . 
b ut also fo r  the fa u lt o f an  independent contractor. T h e  d u ty  is 
thus pitched h igher than in negligence, but low er than that in 
Rylands v. Fletcher, fo r he is not liab le  if he has taken reasonable  
care.
Accepting that the appellant could thus have escaped liability, it be­
comes necessary to consider the acts on his part sufficient to afford him 
this relief. It is apparent that a mere warning to the workers to take 
even- reasonable precaution and to accomplish the undertaking in the 
safest possible manner remains far from adequate, because, for all such
12. Bower v. P eate  — [8761 1 Q.B. 326.
13. Winfield on Torts, (5th ed.) p. 598.
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pleadings, he has no guarantee that they will proceed accordingly. 
Once again the matter of knowledge becomes important: the prin­
cipal’s must equal that of the contractor, if he is competently to deter­
mine when the undertaking is in fact being carried out in the proper 
and most desirable manner. The possession and application of such 
knowledge, it is submitted, elevates the principal to a position where 
he is affecting, if not in fact directing, the actual mode or work; thereby 
is erased the sole distinguishing factor essential to the principal- 
independent contractor relationship.
G. W . N. Cockburn, 
111 Law, U.N.B.
REFORM OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
IN ENGLAND.
Last June seventh the Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) 
Act, 1954, came into force in England and W ales; and in the following 
month judgment was delivered1 in what may prove to be the last of a 
countless number of cases in which the Statute of Frauds has been 
pleaded as a defence.
The legislation, which amended section 4 of the Statute of Frauds2 
and repealed section 4 of the Sale of Goods Act,3 has met with almost 
universal approval—most people considering it long overdue. It has 
been suggested that no one is sorry to see the encF of the Statute of 
Frauds except perhaps a few law teachers, who have lost a perennially 
fertile field for lecture and examination! The Act, in the form of a 
private bill, gave effcct to the First Report of the Law Reform Commit­
tee4 presented to Parliament in April, 1953. This committee in effect 
agreed substantially with the recommendations of the Law Revision 
Committee5 with regard to these matters, and endorsed the reasoning 
of that earlier group.
The Act repealed the whole of section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 
except the clause relating to guarantees (“any special promise to answer 
for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person”). The clause 
relating to land and interests therein had been repealed before and re­
placed by section 40 of the Law of Property Act, 1925.
The Law Revision Committee, after careful consideration, had 
recommended the reform
1. C raxfords (R am sgate) Ltd. v. W illiam s and Steer M anufacturing  Co., L td ., (19541,
1 W.L.R. 1130.
2. In New Brunswick, the corresponding sections to those repealed are subsections
(at, (cl and lei of section 1, Chapter 218, R.S.N.B., 1952.
3. In New Brunswick, section 5, Chapter 199, R.S.N.B., 1952.
4. Law Reform Committee, First Report, 1953, Cmd. 8809.
5. Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, 1937, Cmd. 5449.
